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here the plaintiff is willing to disclose it. He calls a doctor to testify
concerning his injuries and that the injuries were caused by the accident.
However, he objects to the defendant calling a doctor to show that
plaintiff's physical condition previous to the accident was not good.
It is indeed harsh to permit other people to show that his health was good
and to allow the plaintiff to testify to such fact himself and then on the
basis of the privilege to prevent the defendant from showing that it
was not.
The conclusion is submitted that the statute was susceptible of two
constructions. But arguments of Orecedent and policy both favored
admissibility. King v. Barrett, supra, and Spitzer v. Stillngs, supra,
although dealing with the lawyer-client relationship, seemed to cover
the same point and in both cases it was held that the privilege had been
waived. On questions of policy the argument seems equally strong. The
decision would seem to represent a step backward from Ohio's previous
advanced position in regard to the construction of privileges.
PHILIP J. WOLF
FUTURE INTERESTS
RECOGNITION OF DETERMINABLE FEE WHERE THERE Is No
EXPRESS RESERVATION OF POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
Appellant Board of Education filed an action to quiet title to a lot
which had been conveyed to its predecessor by a deed containing the
following recitals: '!said lands to be occupied for the purposes of a
school house and for no other use or purposes whatsoever," and, in the
habendum clause, "to have and to hold . . . so long as the same shall
be used as a site for a school house and no longer." Use of the lot for
school purposes had been discontinued by appellant four years before the
filing of this action. Appellee denied title of appellant and alleged that
he had acquired title from the heirs of one of the original grantors.
Appellant claimed that the deed gave its predecessor an unrestricted fee.
Appellee contended that appellant had only the right to occupy the lot as
long as it was used for school purposes, and that appellant had forfeited
its interest in discontinuing such use. Held, that the language used
clearly expressed an intention on the part of the original grantor to pro-
vide for a reverter and forfeiture and conveyed a tenure limited to the
continued ,use for school purposes, Board of Education v. Hollinesworth
et al., 56 Ohio App. 95 (1936).
The general rule in the construction of deeds, that the intention is
controlling, obtains in the construction of conditions; the language of a
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condition should be construed so as to effectuate if possible the intention
of the parties as gathered from the whole instrument and the existing
facts, Harris v. Roraback, 137 Mich. 292, ioo N.W. 391 (1904); 8
Ruling Case Law 1111; 13 Ohio Juris. 959. Ordinarily mere state-
ments in the deed that the property is conveyed for certain purposes, or
is to remain for stated purposes, and similar statements, are not con-
strued as conditions or limitations of the grant. Raley v. Umatilla
County, 15 Or. 172, 13 Pac. 89o (1897); Faith v. Bowles, 86 Md.
13, 37 Aft. 711 (1897); Barker v. Barrows, 138 Mass. 578 (885);
Chapin v. School District, 35 N.H. 445 (1857); 44 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1222. A conveyance to A and his heirs for a named purpose merely,
does not create a determinable fee. Curtis v. Board of Education, 43
Kan. 138, 23 Pac. 98 (189o); Adams v. First Baptist Church, 148
Mich. 140, 11i N.V. 757, 1I L.R.A. (N.S.) 509, 12 Ann. Cases
224 (1907); Riggs v. New Castle, 229 Pa. 490, 78 Ad. 1037
(191 1); and see In re Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church, 120
Ohio St. 309, 166 N.E. 218 (1929). It has been held that a convey-
ance of land in fee simple "to be used as a cemetery and for no other
purpose" gives the grantee a fee simple absolute, Phinney v. Gardner,
121 Me. 44, 115 At. 523 (1921).
On the other hand, it would seem that no particular words are
necessary as a matter of law for the creation of a determinable fee. In
fact, almost any words which indicate that the fee is to determine auto-
matically upon a named event are sufficient to secure this result. The
typical words are "so long as" or "until" or "during." The presence
of express words of reverter would not ordinarily seem to be essential.
However, one of the most important Ohio cases, In re Copps Chapel
11. E. Church, supra, has indicated that the absence of such words may
tend to show that an absolute fee was created. An expression to the
effect that there will be no reverter in the absence of express terms of
forfeiture may be found in Boyer v. Miller, 21 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 225,
29 Ohio D. 281 (1918).
In general, however, the courts of Ohio have adopted a middle
ground by refusing to impose any arbitrary requirement of particular
language but nevertheless have required that there be-a clearly expressed
intention to convey only a determinable fee. The most significant cri-
terion, as in other states, has been the intention of the grantor. Of
course, the clearest evidence of an intention to create a determinable
fee may be found in conveyances where there has been a coupling of
one of the typical phrases before-mentioned with a clear and definite
expression of a possibility of reverter. May v. Board of Education, 12
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Ohio App. 456 (1920). But when anything less than that appears, i.e.,
where a use is specified but there is no express reservation of a possibility
of reverter, as in the principal case, there arises a more difficult problem
of construction upon which the courts may disagree. The Ohio cases
have held in accordance with the general rule before-mentioned that
the mere expression of a purpose will not of and by itself create a de-
terminable fee. Ashland v. Greiner, 58 Ohio St. 67, 50 N.E. 99
(1898); Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. Co. v. State, 85 Ohio St.
251, 97 N.E. 967, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1219 (1912); Watterson v.
Ury, 5 Ohio C.C. 347, 3 Ohio C.D. 171 (1891); Inre Copps Chapel
M. E. Church, supra.
The court in the instant case approached the question of whether
the deed conveyed an absolute fee or merely a tenure limited to the
continued use for school purposes as presenting the problem of the
intention of the grantor as such intention is gained from the words used.
The court considered the cases of In re Copps Chapel M. E. Church,
supra; Schwing v. McClure et al., 12o Ohio St. 335, I66 N.E. 230
(1929); Licking County Agricultural Society v. County Commission-
ers, 48 Ohio App. 528, 194 N.E. 6o6 (934); Schurch v. Harriman,
47 Ohio App. 383, 191 N.E. 907 (1933). In the Copps Chapel case,
the deed contained the following recital in the habendum clause, "But
they and every one of them (the grantor and his heirs) shall by these
presents be excluded and forever barred so long as said lot is held and
used for church purposes." The court there held that this statement
did not constitute a condition, nor a limitation of the grant, but a mere
covenant that the property should be used in a particular way. The
court distinguished Lessee of Sperry v. Pond, 5 Ohio 388 (832), in
which the language used was much the same as that employed in the
principal case, in that the following expression appears in the deed: "so
long as they should continue to use and improve the same for the express
purpose of grinding and no longer." This was held sufficient to create
a determinable fee although, as in the instant case, no express words
of reverter appeared. The court in the Copps Chapel Case considered
as significant the absence of the phrase "and no longer" which was pres-
ent in the Sperry case. While these words may quite naturally have a
shade sironger meaning as tending to show the intention of the grantor
that the tenure should be limited to the use stated, a technical distinction
upon this basis would seem unwarranted. Yet, while subsequent Ohio
cases have not expressly considered the presence or absence of, such
words as a criterion in construing the intention of the grantor, it is
submitted that a consideration of such a distinction may have influenced
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the thinking of the courts upon this problem of a determinable fee. The
court in the instant case, while agreeing with Judge Marshall's dissent-
ing opinion in the Cofrps Chapel case, that the words "no longer" add
nothing to the strength of the words used to express a limitation, states
that it feels justified in adopting the same line of demarcation used by
the Supreme Court in distinguishing the Sperry case from the Copps
Chapel case, and in concluding that the language used dearly expressed
the intention to provide for a reverter and forfeiture.
There is authority for the decision in the principal case in the Sperry
case and Schurch v. Harraman, supra, in which it was held that a war-
ranty deed to the trustees of a church "as long as used for church pur-
poses," containing a like habendum clause running to such church, but
with no stipulation for forfeiture or reversion, passed a fee simple de-
terminable. It would seem that the court in the instant case has pursued
a sensible and legitimate construction of the words in the deed and has
reached a sound conclusion.
The solution of this problem of construction of determinable fees
will depend in a considerable measure upon the attitude with which the
courts approach the problem. If the court feels the influence of a strong
social policy against remote future interests based upon considerations
somewhat similar to those underlying the rule against perpetuities, it will
be inclined to pursue the more strict and technical method of construc-
tion which was used in the Copps Chapel case. But if the court is
favorably impressed with the efficacy of the determinable fee device as
a means of alienation, it will tend to follow the more liberal construction
based upon the standard of intention as was done in the principal case.
The determinable fee would seem to be justified today only in the case
of conveyances for charitable or educational purposes. Many people
might hesitate to convey property outright to educational and eleemosy-
nary institutions without any restriction upon use. Covenants inserted
to restrict the character of the use are not always specifically enforced
by the courts. Consequently, gifts to such institutions through the device
of determinable fees can be justified. Determinable fees should be recog-
nized where, as in the instant case, an intention to restrict the tenure to
the use named is clearly and adequately expressed.
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